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NOTE
Joinder Of Causes of Action In South Carolina
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1958, the legislature of South Carolina rejected a proposal
of the Judicial Council' to bring the state's civil system in line
with improvements in the civil procedure of federal courts and
progressive state courts. To this day, South Carolina's anachronistic civil system remains unchanged.
The arguments against changing South Carolina's rules of
civil procedure are not persuasive. One contention is that the
present rules can be interpreted judicially to accomplish what a
new system would do. This claim ignores the express statutory
rigidity of many of the rules and the precedents prohibiting liberal judicial interpretation. Another argument against reform is
that lawyers are familiar with the long-standing system and
change would create uncertainty and confusion. This argument
is effectively countered by two observations: first, if rules similar
to the federal rules were adopted, most practitioners would still
be on familiar ground because of their experience in federal court
litigation; second, confusion can easily be avoided by referring to
the wealth of case decisions under modern rules.
On the other hand, the case for reform is very persuasive.
Changing the rules to conform with the federal system would
require attorneys to be skilled in only one system of civil rules.
Additionally, a compact system of rules in a single unit would
bring together rules now widely dispersed in the statutes and
rules of court. More important, however, are the benefits accruing
directly to litigants under a modernized system. Rules worded
similarly to the federal rules would improve the administration
of justice, ease the congested docket, and expedite the litigation
process.
This article analyzes the present status of the law of joinder
of causes of action in South Carolina. A survey of the cases demonstrates the problems which have arisen under the code provision 2 governing joinder. Additionally, other sections of the code
1. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF SOUTH CAROLINA DRAFT, SOUTH CAROLINA RumS OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE

2. S.C.

(1958).
CODE ANN.

§ 10-701 (1962).
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which may affect the issue of joinder are discussed. Finally, the
federal solution 3 to the problems arising under joinder is offered
as an alternative to the present system.
I1.

JOINDER UNDER THE CODE

Unchanged since its adoption in 1870,1 South Carolina joinder provision section 10-7011 allows joinder of legal and equitable
claims6 and divides the kinds of joinable claims into seven catego3. FD. R. Civ. P. 18.
4. South Carolina adopted its entire civil code in 1870, patterned after the 1848 New
York Field Code.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-701 (1962).
What causes of action may be joined.-The plaintiff may unite in the same
complaint several causes of action, whether they be such as have been heretofore
denominated legal or equitable or both, when they all arise out of:
(1) The same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject
of action;
(2) Contract, express or implied;
(3) Injuries with or without force to person and property or either;
(4) Injuries to character;
(5) Claims to recover real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and profits of such property;
(6) Claims to recover personal property, with or without damages for the
withholding thereof; or
(7) Claims against a trustee by virtue of a contract or by operation of law.
But the causes of action so united must (a) all belong to one of these classes,
(b) except in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages, affect all the parties to
the action, (c) not require different places of trial and (d) be separately stated.
6. This is a feature of the joinder rule which is functionally related to the unification
of law and equity. Two cases have arisen under this portion of the joinder statute. In
McMahan v. Dawkins, 22 S.C. 312 (1885), the plaintiff alleged that a conveyance of land
was fraudulent and thus void; he also alleged that he was seized of the fee and thus
entitled to immediate possession of the land. In approving joinder, the supreme court
recognized that joinder of legal and equitable causes served to avoid "circuity of action"
and to afford prompt relief. In Hardin v. Clark, 32 S.C. 480, 11 S.E. 304 (1889), the court
approved joinder of a legal cause of action charging a breach of a convenant of warranty
with a subrogation claim which is equitable in nature.
At common law the question of whether claims could be joined depended on the
mysterious operation of the writ system. As many claims as were subsumable under the
same writ could be joined in the same complaint. Common law joinder is explored in
greater detail in the following works: C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 67, at 435-36 (2d ed.
1947); J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING § 25 (1969); B. SHIPMAN, COMMON
LAW PLEADING § 80 (3d ed. 1923); P. BLiss, CODE PLEADING § 124 (1879); Sunderland,
Joinderof Actions, 18 MICH. L. REv. 571 (1920); F. JAMES, CiviL PROCEDURE § 10.2 (1965);
Note, Joinder--Joinderof Causes of Action in Mississippi, 41 Miss. L.J. 365, 366-68
(1970).
Multiple tort claims could be asserted in one action notwithstanding their separate
factual origins. Because joinder depended on the legal similarity of the claims, claims
arising out of the same factual context but requiring different writs could not be united
in the same complaint. Quite naturally, the rule, while operating to arbitrarily restrict the
scope of a single suit, caused unnecessary expenditure of time and effort by courts and
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss4/3
litigants.
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ries. The first category allows joinder when the causes arise out

of "the same transaction or transactions connected with the same
subject of action"-language taken directly from interpretations
of the concept of "multifariousness" which controlled joinder in
equity prior to the civil code. 7 The remaining six categories,
grounded in the substantive characteristics of the causes of action, retain the common law approach to joinder.' The joinder
statute therefore represents a compromise of common law and
equity joinder rules.
A.

Implications of Joinder: Right to Jury Trial

Under pre-code practices, a plaintiff with legal and equitable
claims was faced with the following dilemma: he could (1) go to
a court at law, lose and, perhaps through some res judicata effect,
forfeit his equitable remedy or (2) go to the equity court and risk
the unpredictable but more flexible chancellor's justice Out of
this process developed the "clean-up" doctrine which entailed the
disposition of incidental legal questions and the grant of compensation to avoid a multiplicity of suits when equitable relief
failed.'" The price of a litigant's choice of this informal merger
7. Joinder of equitable claims was governed by a policy of convenience. Broadly
stated, equitable claims were joinable unless the bill could be characterized as "multifarious." F. JAMES, supra note 6, § 10.3. The rule of "multifariousness" applied also to
joinder of parties. Id. Essentially, a determination of "multifariousness" meant that it
would be inconvenient for the court to entertain all the matters raised in the bill. The
broad rule of convenience vested the chancellor with wide discretion in deciding questions
of joinder. Judicial statements on joinder in equity foreshadowed the formulation of modem joinder rules. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 6, at 437 n.7.
8. F. JAMES, supra note 6, § 10.2.
9. In certain situations, a plaintiff was forced to go first to equity, e.g., when he
needed reformation of a contract before recovering on that contract. Another pattern
developed in situations in which plaintiff's title was questioned by defendant in a nuisance
action. Equity required that the title first be tried in a court at law before plaintiff
returned to equity for injunctive relief. If title was not questioned, plaintiff could go first
to equity for injunctive relief or a court for damages at law. See James, Right to a Jury
Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 669-79 (1963).
10. Alderman v. Cooper, 257 S.C. 304, 185 S.E.2d 809 (1971); Southern Ry. v. Gossett, 79 S.C. 372, 60 S.E. 956 (1908); Page v. Sheet, Speer's Eq. 159 (S.C. 1843); Backler
v. Farrow, 2 Hill's Eq. 111 (S.C. 1834). See also Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury:
A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 320, 320-21 (1951).
The doctrine was first employed in situations in which the factual elements of the
claim were altered after commencement of the equitable proceeding through a change of
circumstances outside the control of plaintiff, thus negating the equitable claim. Later the
doctrine expanded to include many other situations in which the equitable claim failed.
J. STORY, Equrry JURISPRUDENCP §§ 71, 82, 83 (14th ed. 1918); James, supranote 9, at 670.
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was that both litigants lost their right to a trial of legal issues by
a jury.
With the merger of equitable and legal practices into a unified code allowing the joinder of equitable and legal causes of
action, the awkwardness of the dual system supposedly was eliminated." Because of the requirement under the constitution that
"[tihe right of trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate," 1 however, several new problems have arisen concerning the parameters of party rights to jury trials.
To accomodate the constitutional mandate, the code
attempts to designate which matters are to be tried by jury and
which are to be tried by the court. Section 10-1056 states that all
issues of law and "cases in chancery" are to be tried by the court,
whereas factual issues "in an action for the recovery of money
only or of specific real or personal property must be tried by a
test for jury trials of section 10-1056 in terms of
jury." 3 The
"action"' 4 is unnecessarily vague and overly broad since distinctions could easily have been made between legal and equitable
issues, regardless of the characterization of the overall action.
The present language suggests that the court will be able to determine whether the right to jury trial exists by examining the basic
nature of the action, 5 but rarely will one be able to identify an
entire action as including only legal issues or only equitable issues. Also, because affirmative action is unnecessary to procure
11. As there are no longer two separate systems, the clean-up doctrine would seem
to be obsolete. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1964).
12. S.C. CoNT. art. 1 § 25. See Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531, 544 (1970) (dissent)
(preserved not expanded). See also Whaley, Handbook of South CarolinaTrial andAppellate Practices, 11 S.C.L. REv. 50 (Supp. 1959).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1056 (1962). Section 10-1056 places two other limitations on
jury trials: they may be waived by § 10-1209 or the action may be referred to a master.
The reference alluded to here is the consensual reference of § 10-1401, not the compulsory
version of section 10-1403, as compulsory reference appropriate for equitable matters is
recognized as subordinate to the constitutional provision securing jury trial rights. DeWalt
v. Kinard, 19 S.C. 286 (1883).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-9 (1962) defines "action" as "an ordinary proceeding in a
court of justice by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong or punishment of a public offense."
15. Cf. Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1940), criticized in Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948).
16. Section 10-1056, however, might be interpreted to make a distinction between
cases in chancery and actions for the recovery of money or of specific real or personal
property, in which equitable issues arise and are to be determined by the court. Arguably,
§ 10.1058 can be interpreted as providing court trial of equitable issues in actions triable
by a jury under section 10-1056:

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss4/3
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a jury trial on legal issues" but necessary to waive one's jury trial
rights,' 8 and because no time limit is placed on a jury trial request,'" questions of court calender and trial form are left unresolved until actual trial. This scheme places unreasonable burdens on the court system and results in jury trials when the parties may be indifferent to trial format.
Perhaps section 10-1056 is an attempt to anticipate the creation of new actions and remedies and to classify them roughly for
trial purposes. Although this rough classification exhibits a high
degree of flexibility, the old equity/at law distinction, arbitrary
under modern standards, does not comport with considerations of
modern judicial administration. As commendable as this anticipatory division of labor between court and jury trials might be,
the enterprise must remain accountable to the constitutional provision securing jury trial rights. It has been suggested that the
code is doing too much since the constitution froze the availability of jury trial to only those actions at law recognizable at the
time of the constitutional enactment. This interpretation would
preclude extending jury trials to actions created after enactment
of the 1868 constitution though analogous to a pre-constitutional
action at law. 2° This historical approach not only affords a high
degree of predictability, for those who find jury trials to be overly
Every other issue is triable by the court which, however, may order the whole
issue or any specific question of fact involved therein to be tried by a jury or
may refer it as provided in §§ 10-1401 to 10-1405.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1058 (1962). See Meetze v. Charlotte Ry., 23 S.C. 1 (1885).
17. See Capell v. Moses, 36 S.C. 559, 15 S.E. 711 (1892).
18. See DeWalt v. Kinard, 19 S.C. 286 (1883).
19. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 28, placing a time limit on requests for a jury trial in equity cases,
provides (in part):
In equity cases where a trial by jury of issues of fact may be desired, the party
desiring a jury trial shall within ten days after issue joined give notice in writing
of his intention to move the Court. ...
20. This historical approach is an acceptable interpretation of the cases. The 1845
constitution referred to preserving jury trials "as heretofore used." Commissioners v.
Seabrook, 2 Strob. 560 (S.C. 1846). In White v. Kendrick, 1 Brev. 469 (S.C. 1805) the court
actually raised the question whether the 1790 constitution secured or extended jury trial
rights: "The constitution in the clause alluded to, has established an epoch, from which
legislative innovation on the trial by jury shall cease." Id. at 471. Other cases dealing with
the more recent constitutional provision of 1868, enacted before the 1870 code of civil
procedure, also accept the historical approach. McGlohon v. Harlan, 254 S.C. 207, 174
S.E.2d 753 (1970); Collier v. Green, 244 S.C. 367, 137 S.E.2d 277 (1964); Richards v.
Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); State v. Gibbes, 109 S.C. 135, 95 S.E. 346
(1918); Smith & Co. v. Bryce, 17 S.C. 538 (1882). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1403
(1962).
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burdensome, but also is a power check on its expansion.' To read
the historical approach into the constitution, however, is to encounter inconsistencies between the statutes and the cases. Preservation but not expansion of jury trial rights permits little court
discretion concerning the mode of trial. Nevertheless, section 101056 has been construed to provide discretion in the circuit courts
on the availability of jury trials in actions "not specified in section 10-1056.''2 Also, section 10-1057 states:
In all equity causes in the courts of common pleas of this State
the presiding judge may, in his discretion, cause to be framed
an issue or issues of fact to be tried by a jury.?
Since cases have held that the jury of section 10-1057 is merely
advisory,2" however, there is no real expansion of the nonadvisory
jury trial recognized by the constitutional provision.
Under the pre-code system, the dual court structure gave the
plaintiff control of both the conduct of trial and of the defendant's
ability to request jury trials.25 By first seeking an equitable hear-

ing, the plaintiff could air legal matters under the clean-up doctrine, defeating any right defendant may have had to a jury trial
in a court of law. The question arises whether the code system,
in order to avoid expanding jury trial rights, should preserve the
plaintiff's control over the conduct of the trial. If the plaintiff asks
for legal and equitable relief and objects to defendant's demand
for a jury trial, he is showing his preference for equitable relief;

that is, if there were two systems, he would first be going to
equity. Thus defendant's demand for a jury trial should be de21. Of course one may argue that the constitution only protected the preconstitutional scheme of jury trials from inroads of the equity practices. Modes of handling
new actions and remedies are left to be defined by statute. This interpretation runs afoul
of the language of several cases that suggest that there is a right to a non-jury trial.
Johnstone v. Matthews, 183 S.C. 360, 191 S.E. 223 (1935); Hammond v. Foreman, 43 S.C.
264, 21 S.E. 3 (1895). In Hammond, the court intimated that the statute providing for
jury trials applied only to claims and defenses previously cognizable in courts of law. A
broader interpretation would raise constitutional problems. See Van Hecke, TrialBy Jury
in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv. 157 (1952); Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv.
L. REv. 1176 (1961).
22. Pelzer v. Hughes, 27 S.C. 408, 3 S.E. 781 (1887). Arguably, Pelzer is impliedly
referring to § 10-1057 in which discretion does operate.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1057 (1962). See Meier v. Kornahrens, 113 S.C. 270, 102 S.E.
285 (1920).
24. Johnstone v. Matthews, 183 S.C. 360, 191 S.E. 223 (1937); In re Nightingale's
Estate, 182 S.C. 527, 189 S.E. 890 (1937).
25. McCoid, Right to Jury Trial in the Federal Courts, 45 IowA L. REv. 726 (1960).
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nied.2 1 Fortunately, South Carolina has not adopted this system.2 1

It is not clear that the clean-up doctrine during the era of the dual
system was legitimately used beyond a few instances of "changed
circumstances" after the equitable action was commenced. Furthermore, good sense suggests that the merger of law and equity
under the code eliminates the need for the doctrine.28 There is no
reason to expand the notion of substituted legal relief in equity
after merger, except as an effort to curtail jury trials which
merger was not supposed to accomplish. One may argue also that
the suggested system unnecessarily restricts plaintiff's options.
Under the preference system, plaintiff may prefer equitable relief
but still desire a jury trial on his legal claim. His asking for a jury
trial should not be construed as a preference for legal relief with
the legal claim tried first, but as an attempt to preserve his jury
trial rights if adjudicating the legal claim becomes necessary.
Traditionally, equitable matters were tried first to the chancellor who enjoined any related proceeding at law." If additional
legal relief was necessary or the equitable claim failed, in a subsequent legal action both parties could be faced with the res judicata effect of prior factual determination; thus a full jury trial on
the legal claim would be restricted. An exception to this order
26. Federal courts do not recognize this approach. Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 838 (8th
Cir. 1952). Cf. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
In South Carolina, a plaintiff does have control over the defendant's ability to assert
a right to a jury trial when a defendant presents a legal counterclaim to an equitable
action. By bringing this legal counterclaim, defendant has been held to have waived his
jury trial rights on issues underlying the claim. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1321 (1968).
However, South Carolina courts usually state that the factual issues underlying the
claim are not part of an action for recovery of money or specific real or personal property.
If the facts and events giving rise to both the cause of action and counterclaim are so
interwoven as to be inseparable, the defense "partakes of the nature of the cause of
action" and is not triable to a jury as of right. Welborn v. Cobb, 92 S.C. 384, 389, 75 S.E.
691, 693 (1912).
Under the federal system, when the defendant counters an equitable claim with a
legal claim, distinctions are made between permissive and compulsory counterclaims. If
permissive, the counterclaim may be asserted in a separate action, and bringing it in the
equitable action could constitute a waiver. If compulsory, defendant has no choice-he
asserts it or loses it. In this situation no waiver is found. Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass,
81 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1948). Federal courts have gone even further in protecting
against a res judicta effect of factual issues arising within the equitable claim on legal
issues by reversing the historical order of trying equitable claims first when there is a
common nucleus of operative facts to both claim and counterclaim. Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
27. Airfare, Inc. v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 249 S.C. 265, 153 S.E.2d 846 (1967).
28. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1964).
29. W. P. Boyle Co. v. Automobile Ins. Co., 168 S.C. 63, 166 S.E. 886 (1932).
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existed in cases in which trying a legal issue first might make
litigation of the equitable claim unnecessary. For example, in a
nuisance or trespass action, a defendant's denial of plaintiff's
title, if successful, would preclude the main action from continuing." One again may ask whether the traditional order and res
judicata effect as part of the prior system are to be preserved by
the constitutional provision. South Carolina courts have construed the order of trial to be discretionary-an interpretation
suggesting that not all of the historical approach is preserved.'
In the federal system, the historical order and res judicata or
estoppel effect have been criticized as defeating defendant's
rights to a full jury trial on factual issues raised on a counterclaim
having factual affinity with equitable issues in plaintiff's complaint.32 The solution is to reverse the order of trial or permit the
jury to make new determinations.
Even if neither the order nor plaintiff's control is strictly
preserved, there is an additional limitation, besides the equity/at
law distinction, placed on the availability of jury trials. Section
10-1209 provides:
Trial by jury in the court of common pleas may be waived by
the several parties to an issue of fact in actions on contract and
with the assent of the court in other actions in the manner
following:
(1) By failing to appear at the trial;
(2) By written consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the
clerk; or
(3) By oral consent in open court entered in the minutes."
As mentioned earlier, a waiver provision that requires affirmative
action allows inertia and party indifference to result in a cumbersome trial by jury. Since time limitations are absent, court calendars cannot be effectively planned. Notwithstanding the requirements of section 10-1209 that waiver be manifested in a particular
manner, South Carolina courts have suggested that joining legal
and equitable claims places a burden on plaintiff to request a jury
trial on the legal claim and failure to do so results in waiver of
30. Central Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 77 S.C. 1, 57 S.E. 531 (1907); Lipscomb v. Little-

john, 63 S.C. 38, 40 S.E. 1023 (1902); Alston v. Limehouse, 60 S.C. 559, 39 S.E. 188 (1901).
See also J. PoMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 2294-2318 (4th ed. 1919).
31. Du Bose v. Kell, 76 S.C. 313, 56 S.E. 968 (1907).
32. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1209 (1962).
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that right.3 4 This construction of waiver is consistent with the
federal rule requiring affirmative action to preserve one's right to
a jury trial,35 but inconsistent with section 10-1209 prescribing a
precise method of waiver and with cases suggesting that jury
trials need not be formally demanded to be obtained36 and that
37
inaction does not constitute waiver.
B.

The Seven Categories of Joinable Causes of Action
1.

The Transaction Class

Section 10-701(1), the broadest and most accessible of the
seven categories, allows joinder of causes of action which arise out
of the "same transaction or transactions connected with the same
subject of action" regardless of the substantive content of the
claims. As mentioned previously, this category is an extension of
the joinder rule in equity which sought to follow a common sense
approach by emphasizing the goals of convenience, economy, and
orderly judicial administration. 3 Futhermore, it is the only legitimate procedure-oriented category in the joinder section of the
code.
Justice Littlejohn in Gantt v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.39
made the following broad policy statement regarding the "transaction" category:
34. McMahan v. Dawkins, 22 S.C. 319, 320 (1885).
Other cases suggest that consensual reference constitutes a waiver of jury trial rights.
Griffith v. Cromley, 58 S.C. 448, 36 S.E. 738 (1900); Trenholm v. Morgan, 28 S.C. 268, 5
S.E. 721 (1888). Section 10-1056 does mention reference but not as a waiver although the
practical effect is the same-avoidance of jury trial.
This waiver notion should be distinguished from the waiver concept offered by a New
York court that the plaintiff waived a jury trial by joining legal and equitable claims.
DiMenna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917). Cf. Rainwater v.
Merchants' & Farmers' Bank, 108 S.C. 206, 93 S.E. 770 (1917). This view has been
criticized as contrary to the concept of unification or merger of the code which was
supposed to facilitate joinder of legal and equitable claims, and it may be an illegitimate
cost to impose on litigants attempting to take advantage of merger. Leimer v. Woods, 196
F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1952); Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946).
35. FEn. R. Civ. P. 38(d) (in part): "The failure of a party to serve a demand as
required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of
trial by jury." But under FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b) the district court on party motion has the
power to order a jury trial even if a party fails to make a seasonable demand. Swofford v.
B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1964).
36. Capell v. Moses, 36 S.C. 559, 15 S.E. 711 (1892); DeWalt v. Kinard, 19 S.C. 286
(1883).
37. Sale v. Meggett, 25 S.C. 72 (1886).
38. See C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 437; F. JAMEs, supra note 6, § 10.3.
39. 254 S.C. 112, 173 S.E.2d 658 (1970).
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The primary purpose of this section is to allow joinder of causes
of action germane to each other and thereby avoid as far as
possible a multiplicity of suits. This has always been important.
In this day of congested dockets and long delays before trials it
is even more important. This court has held that joinder should
be permitted when the causes of action are reasonably connected by the coincidence of time, place and circumstances,
where the causes of action are materially allied in substance in
interrelated [sic], and where the development of the actions
40
tell a connected story.
The court should implement the purposes of transactional joinder
by inquiring specifically whether: (1) settling the controversy in
one proceeding will prejudice the parties; (2) joinder will eliminate multiple lawsuits and reduce docket congestion; and (3)
joinder will reduce the financial burden of litigants.
The transaction category offers courts the most rational solution to the problems of multiple claims for it gives the trial judge
wide discretion to decide joinder questions with the objective of
conducting an efficient and responsive court. The trial judge
should understand that applying procedural rules rigidly is
hardly justifiable when common sense dictates otherwise and a
more flexible alternative exists. Moreover, the trial judge's decision on joinder is entitled to substantial weight on appeal as he
is better qualified to balance the relative interests. Where the
scope of the litigation is in issue, the trial judge's reasoned judgment is the best indicator of what can reasonably and fairly be
accomplished in one proceeding. The supreme court's obligation
is to review whether a proper inquiry has been made, but otherwise it should rely on the trial judge's findings unless they are
clearly erroneous.
The cases illustrate that the transaction class has been the
victim of both misuse and non-use.4 In Bateman v. Wymojo Yarn
40. Id. at 119-20, 173 S.E.2d at 661. Essentially the same statement is made in Winter
v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 240 S.C. 561, 569, 126 S.E.2d 724, 728 (1962).
41. One recent case not discussed under this heading is Winter v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 240 S.C. 561, 126 S.E.2d 724 (1962), which stated that the sole issue was
whether the causes of action were inconsistent. Winter determined the pleadings were not
inconsistent because the causes of action arose out of the same transaction. This is a
peculiar approach since the rule against inconsistent pleadings and the operation of the
transaction class under § 10-701 are two different procedural restrictions. See text at notes
133-36 infra. It seems that the court itself is guilty of "jumbling" the cases because in
Winter the court cites Cline v. Southern Ry., 110 S.C. 534, 96 S.E. 532 (1917), Martin v.
Keith, 21 S.C. 241, 52 S.E.2d 22 (1949), and Ripley v. Rodgers, 213 S.C. 541, 50 S.E.2d
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Mills42 the complaint stated claims for slander, malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, and trespass on property.
The court held that because the causes fell within different
classes of section 10-70111 the claims could not be joined. The
court did not mention the transaction class even though the underlying facts of the controversy constituted a cohesive unit.4
The plaintiff apparently failed to argue for joinder under the
transaction class,45 but even so the court should have avoided
such an irrational decision. Bateman has drawn well-deserved
criticism ."
575 (1948), all of which in fact involve the issue of whether joinder is permissible under
the transaction category, along with the cases of Stuckey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
195 S.C. 358, 11 S.E.2d 391 (1940), Kneece v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 202 S.C.
412, 25 S.E.2d 290 (1943), and Walker v. McDonald, 136 S.C. 231, 134 S.E. 222 (1926),
which involve the issue of whether the causes of action are inconsistent. The court has
failed to distinguish the statutory rule from the judicially created rule and this failure has
been the source of considerable confusion. A practitioner should be careful to state clearly
the grounds of his objection to joinder. He may argue that the causes do not arise out of
the same transaction or that the causes are inconsistent or both. Otherwise, the court may
examine only one possible ground of misjoinder, as it did in Cline. There the exception
was stated that the court erred in failing to find a misjoinder of actions without giving
the grounds therefor. The court applied only the statutory test of whether the causes arose
out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action.
Arguably, the result would have been different if the exception had specified that the
causes were inconsistent.
Nevertheless, the court in Winter blends the statutory objection with the judicially
created objection in a fashion that implies they are the same. Even if they are in South
Carolina, they are not in most other jurisdictions.
42. 155 S.C. 388, 152 S.E. 675 (1930).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-701(3) & (4).
44. This action is predicated on the statement as alleged in the complaint
in substance; that at the instance and request of the defendants the peace
officers of the City of Rock Hill, S.C., illegally searched the house of the respondent, thereafter arrested him, placed him in the city jail, held him in jail for
twenty-four hours, charged him with being a bootlegger, carried him through the
streets of Rock Hill, S.C., as a prisoner, locked him up in the city jail ....
Record, vol. 77, at 1. Bateman v. Wymojo Yam Mills, 155 S.C. 388, 152 S.E. 675 (1929).
45. The plaintiff argued for joinder under section 427 of the 1922 Code of Civil Procedure (S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-679 (1962)) which states:
When two or more acts of negligence or other wrongs are set forth in the complaint as causing or contributing to the injury for which the suit is brought, the
party plaintiff in such suit shall not be required to elect upon which he will go
to trial, but he shall be entitled to submit his whole case to the jury under the
instruction of the court and to recover such damages as he has sustained,
whether such damages arose from one or another or all of such acts or wrongs
alleged in the complaint.
This is the so-called "Jumbling Statute" which does allow "jumbling" of alleged
negligent acts but does not allow the jumbling of causes of action. Hopkins v. Shuman,
235 S.C. 191, 110 S.E.2d 713 (1959). See text accompanying note 114 infra.
46. F. JAMEs, supra note 6, § 10.4, at 451-54; Comment, 25 ILL. L. REv. 835 (1931).
Bateman
hasby
been
overruled
by implication.
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The court in Cline v. Southern Ry. 47 held that causes of action for breach of a parol employment contract and for fraudulent inducement in the contracting were joinable under section
10-701(1). It determined the "transaction" to be the execution of
a written release exchanged for the plaintiff's consent to the employment contract and the "subject of the action" to be the tort,
which was the alleged fraudulent inducement. Such an analysis
is unpredictable and cumbersome, for specific applications of the
technical statutory words "subject of the action" provide no
meaningful answer to joinder problems. 8 In Cline, for example,
the "subject of the action" could have been either the parol contract or the tort.
Common sense, rather than a dogmatic, inflexible interpretation of the statute's technical language should dictate the solution. Rigid interpretations may be appealing to the trial judge for
offering a prompt, temporary solution, but the net results are
increased burden to the docket, delay in the administration of
justice, and unnecessary expenditures. A functional approach
would place emphasis on the underlying purposes of the statute:
fairness, convenience and the avoidance of multiple suits.
Ripley v. Rogers49 illustrates a more enlightened approach of
implementing the underlying purposes of section 10-701. Ripley,
the plaintiff, had fallen asleep, apparently as a result of intoxication, in the rear seat of defendant's cab while the driver dined at
a nearby restaurant. Meanwhile, the cab was stolen and wrecked,
47. 110 S.C. 534, 96 S.E. 532 (1917).
48. Professor Pomeroy disagrees with this statement. He argues that the terms
"transaction," "connected with," and "subject of action" should be defined in a "general
and positive manner." Further, "[u]ntil such a definition is made, each case must be
decided upon its own circumstances, in a mere empirical method, so that the confusion
and uncertainty will continue, and even increase, in the place of the uniformity and
certainty in the practice which the profession and suitors have the right to demand." J.
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 358, at 550 (5th ed. 1929). Considerations of "uniformity" and
"certainty" do not outweigh the considerations of convenience, fairness, and economy,
which have been emphasized in the adoption of modem joinder rules. It must be remembered that joinder is essentially a problem appropriately addressed at the pleading stage
of the litigation, at which point a decision should be made according to the particular
circumstances of the case. A universal definition for each of the terms would eventually
defeat the policies of joinder simply because the inevitable result would be restrictive
classifications. Cases would either fall within or without the definition and the problem
would be terminated. This would mark a positive step toward certainty and uniformity,
but the original purposes and policies of joinder would carry little weight. Nevertheless,
the court in each case should apply the broad terminology of the joinder rule such that
the underlying policies are always effectuated.
49. 213 S.C. 541, 50 S.E.2d 575 (1948).
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causing injury to Ripley. The next day, the defendant informed
the local newspaper that Ripley had stolen the cab and the newspaper published the story. The defendant demurred to Ripley's
complaint for misjoinder, alleging that a negligence claim could
not be joined with a claim for defamation. The trial judge, however, permitted joinder since he found that the two causes of
action arose out of the same transaction. The supreme court affirmed the decision, stating that
it is clear that a connected story may be told, connecting the two
causes of action; they are germane to each other. The two causes
of action arose out of one and the same transaction, forming a
group of related acts. They are inseparably connected by the
coincidence of time, place and circumstances."
An inflexible application of the transaction class could easily
have resulted in a finding of two technically unrelated transactions, but the court adopted a common sense approach and allowed the parties to settle this controversy in one lawsuit. The
court viewed the two causes of action as emerging from only one
"transaction"; it could have found just as easily two separate
transactions and allowed joinder on the basis of their interrelation. This analysis suggests that the "transaction" itself encompasses a broad range of contact between the parties. A logical
implication is that even though the court has frequently emphasized the coincidence of time, place and circumstances, varying
weight may be given to each factor. For instance, the transaction
may more appropriately be characterized by referring to the circumstances of the controversy rather than to the elements of time
and place when the circumstances constitute an interrelated sequence. Unquestionably, allowing joinder in such a case would
50. Id. at 545, 50 S.E.2d at 576-77. The court also commented further:

A review of the authorities discloses that courts and text writers have expended
much time and learning in attempting to define the meaning of the phrase,

"subject to the action," as used in the statute relating to the joinder of causes

of action. Despite the efforts of the courts at generalization, the statute has
remained a matter of specific application to the facts of each particular case.
The term "transaction" is generally held to embrace and have reference to all
the acts, or groups of related acts, which go to make up one entire project,
system or deal, and includes all the facts and circumstances out of which the
injuries complained of arise. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes
of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity, and a liberal
construction according to the rules as to remedial laws should be given.
Id. at 544, 50 S.E.2d at 576.
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further the purposes of the joinder rule. Ideally, the scope of the
litigation should be coextensive with the goals of fairness to the
parties and orderly judicial administration.'
Three months after Ripley, the court retreated from the pragmatic approach in Martin v. Keith.2 The complaint contained a
cause of action for malicious prosecution together with a cause of
action for destruction of personal property. The plaintiff authorized the defendant to repair his car but stopped payment on his
check after discovering that the repairs had not been completed.
During the following months, the defendant refused to repair the
car properly. Five months after the initial demand for repairs the
defendant swore out a warrant against the plaintiff for passing a
fraudulent check; plaintiff was arrested, but the charges were
dismissed for failure of prosecution. Seven months after this
episode the defendant instituted a civil action to enforce his mechanic's lien and took possession of the car. While the car was in
his care, it was damaged through exposure to the elements. The
plaintiff then regained possession in a claim and delivery proceeding.
Clearly impressed by the interval between the criminal prosecution and the destruction of the car, the supreme court held
that the two causes of action could not be joined under section
10-701(1) because the connection of events was "too remote,
uncertain and attenuated in order to say that both arose out of
the same transaction or transactions, connected with the same
subject of action. ' ' 13 Joinder should have been approved in
Martin because the two causes of action arose out of a continuing course of related events-an intertwined factual setting.
Although the court considered the passage of time a crucial
factor, it made an insufficient inquiry into the companion elements of place and circumstances even though the events
occurred within the same general geographical area and also
constituted a single story.
The court in Martin states that
if there is a lack of substantial identity, the several causes of
action may, for their decision, depend upon very different facts
51. The federal rules have adopted this policy of expanding the scope of litigation
commensurate with fairness to the litigants. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
52. 214 S.C. 241, 52 S.E.2d 22 (1949). It is interesting to note that Justice Fishburne
wrote the opinions in Ripley and Martin.
53. Martin v. Keith, 214 S.C. 241, 246, 52 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1949).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss4/3
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and principles of law, which would tend to confusion and uncertainty in the trial of the case, and result in great prejudice to
some, if not all, of the parties. 4
While this observation was not directed to the joinder issue, it did
raise two potentially crucial considerations: jury confusion and
prejudice to the parties. Although section 10-701 fails to consider
these two problems, the trial court's discretion is always broad
enough to deal effectively with both. If such discretion is lacking,
the administration of justice becomes little more than an empty
promise. That the size of the litigation is enlarged when multiple
causes or multiple parties are involved should not automatically
raise the inference that the jury will be confused or that a party
or parties will be prejudiced. The circumstances of each case
should be carefully examined by the trial judge, and the disadvantages and the advantages of joinder should be balanced when
determining the scope of the lawsuit. In addition, he must consider whether the policy of joinder will be implemented if joinder
is allowed. If not, the inquiry should be closed. If the policy is
implemented by joinder, the trial judge then must ask whether
the jury will be confused by the submission to them of the facts
underlying the multiple causes of action and whether a party or
parties will be prejudiced by the jury's deciding issues contemporaneously. In Martinthere is little evidence that the jury would
have been confused or that the parties would have been prejudiced by joinder. After criminal proceedings had been instituted
against the plaintiff, the claim of property damage could not have
been construed as prejudicial to the defendant since valuation of
property damage, by its very nature, is not susceptible to material distortion. Confusion of the jury could hardly have been a
factor because the events formed a continuing course of related
conduct. Even if there is a likelihood of jury confusion or
prejudice to the parties, there may be alternatives to ruling joinder impermissible. For instance, if a danger of jury confusion
exists, the most convenient and economical solution is to empanel a separate jury.5 Potential prejudice to the parties also might
54. Id. at 245, 52 S.E.2d at 23-24.
55. The federal courts are authorized to hold separate trials. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b)
states:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or
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be effectively eliminated by having evidence of the different
claims presented before different juries. Besides economizing on
time and expenses associated with initiating new actions, separate trials may resolve the multi-faceted controversy in a single
judicial proceeding. Even potential jury confusion or prejudice to
the parties, however, may not justify a separate trial when it can
be shown to be inconvenient, unduly expensive or unreasonably
time-consuming.
In addition, the legislature has expressly approved the concept of separate trials in two statutes. Section 10-1202 states that
"a separate trial between a plaintiff and any of the several defendants may be allowed by the court whenever, in its opinion, justice will thereby be promoted;"5 and section 10-644 provides that
upon sustaining a demurrer for misjoinder "the court may, in its
discretion and upon such terms as may be just, order the action
to be divided into as many actions as may be necessary to the
proper determination of the causes of action therein mentioned."57 Unfortunately, neither statute has been effectively or
consistently utilized, but as litigation in the state courts becomes
inevitably more complex, innovative litigants should be turning
to them more frequently.
The recent case of Gantt v. Universal CI..T. Credit Corp.58
illustrates a more modern pragmatic interpretation of the scope
of joinder with respect to causes of action stemming from the
same transaction or from transactions connected with the same
subject of the action. The plaintiff's husband purchased an automobile in November 1966 under an installment sales contract
subsequently assigned to the defendant. During 1966 and 1967
the defendant frequently telephoned the plaintiff at work to complain of delinquent payments and disseminated information on
the deliquency to her co-employees. The plaintiff eventually resigned her job in humiliation. The defendant repossessed the car
in December 1967, without returning several items of personal
property located in the car. He also reported the repossession to
the local credit bureau, and a subsequent negative credit bureau
of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or
issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States.
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1202 (1962).
57. Id. § 10-644 (1962).

58. 254 S.C. 112, 173 S.E.2d 658 (1970).
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communication resulted in a denial of a loan to the plaintiff. By
demurrer the defendant contended that claims for invasion of
plaintiff's right of privacy, defamation, and conversion were improperly joined; the plaintiff countered that section 10-701(1)
permitted joinder of those claims. The court determined that the
events giving rise to the claims constituted "a continuing episode
of conduct on the part of the defendant," and further that the
"identity of parties, place, time and circumstances [warranted]
disposition of all issues in one trial." 9
The impact of Gantt on the earlier narrow interpretation of
the joinder provision should be substantial. First, the court omitted any reference to the archaic and absurd law of Bateman v.
Wymojo Yarn Mills."0 Consequently, one need no longer fear that
claims joined properly under the transaction class will be ruled
impermissibly joined for falling into different categories. Second,
the court adopted the realistic position permitting disposition in
one proceeding of the entire controversy grounded in a "continuing episode of conduct." In following this approach; the court
discredited Martin v. Keith.' Martin held joinder impermissible
when one year had separated the accrual of the two causes of
action although there was evidence for the view that "a connected
story may be told of the sequence of events." 2 Emphasizing the
"continuing episode of conduct," Gantt assigned significance to
the chronological factors in terms of their relation to the question
of whether or not the events were rationally connected.
2.

The Substantive Categories

Under the common law system of pleading, claims based on
widely separated groups of facts but falling within the legal limits
of a certain form of action could be joined in different counts;
claims under different forms of action could not be joined, no
matter how factually related they were.63 The original 1848 Field
Code abolished the common law forms of action; yet a vestige of
common law pleading remained in the joinder provision which
contains six categories based on the substantive content of the
claims. The substantive categorization of claims is retained specifically in the South Carolina joinder provision.
59. Id. at 120, 173 S.E.2d at 661.

60. 155 S.C. 388, 152 S.E. 675 (1930).
61. 214 S.C. 241, 52 S.E.2d 22 (1949).
62. Id. at 246, 52 S.E.2d at 24.

63. See C.
supra
note 6, at2020
436.
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Several causes of action may be joined in the same complaint
when they all arise out of "contract, express or implied."64
Sullivan v. Sullivan Manufacturing Co."s illustrates the simplicity of applying this subsection of the provision to find joinder of
claims arising under the contractual class. The complaint styled
a cause of action for amounts due on a note and a cause of action
for amounts owing on open account. Observing that the causes
arose out of contract, and without directly referring to the joinder
statute, 0 the court held that they were properly joined." More
recently, in Cooper v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co.,6" the court
noted that two causes of action arising out of alleged third party
beneficiary contracts could be united pursuant to the contract
class of section 10-701. The litigation under this category is sparse
simply because contract actions are usually easily identifiable. If
one of the causes falls outside the contract class, such as a cause
for fraudulent inducement in making a contract, which is a tort,
the plaintiff must rely on the transaction class.
The second substantive category, section 10-701(3), allows
joinder when the causes of action all arise out of "injuries with
or without force to person and property or either." Illustrative of
5 in which the complaint alleged
this section is Fowler v. Floyd"
assault and battery and trespass to land. The trial court had
granted defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to elect one of the
two causes of action, but the supreme court held this ruling to be
erroneous under the joinder statute. The court in Bateman v.
Wymojo Yarn Mills 70 acknowledged that the causes of malicious
prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, and trespass upon
real property were joinable under this category. Although the
Bateman court designated an action for malicious prosecution as
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-701(2) (1962).
65. 14 S.C. 494 (1881).
66. Id. at 500. Scoggins v. Smith, 31 S.C. 605, 9 S.E. 971 (1889), reaches the same
conclusion as to a complaint containing a cause of action on contract and the cause of

action in quantum meruit. Cf. Gwathney v. Burgess, 98 S.C. 152, 82 S.E. 394 (1914) (cause
on account joinable with cause on open account because both arise out of contract).
67. Justice McIver's analysis deserves mention. While he styles the sole issue as
"whether several causes of action have been improperly joined in the complaint," his
careful analysis begins at the fundamental level of examining exactly what constituted
the causes of action. Deciding the scope of the "cause of action" has caused enormous
problems in the context of joinder of causes of action.
68. 244 S.C. 286, 136 S.E.2d 774 (1964).

69. 204 S.C. 118, 28 S.E.2d 641 (1944).
70. 155 S.C. 388, 152 S.E. 675 (1930). See text accompanying notes 42 through 46

supra for a full discussion of this case.
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an injury to the person, it would ordinarily fall within the next
class, section 10-701(4), which covers injuries to character. 71 The
class of injuries to character would include causes of action
for slander and libel, as well as malicious prosecution,
notwithstanding Bateman's characterizing it as an injury to person.
Causes arising out of "claims to recover real property, with
or without damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and
profits of such property '7 2 are ejectment and trespass for mesne
profits. Professor Bliss noted that "[tihe object of the clause is
not so much to authorize the recovery of damages in real actions
as the union in one proceeding of causes of action for the recovery
'73
of distinct parcels of land.
Section 10-701(6) permits causes of action to be joined when
they all arise out of "claims to recover personal property, with or
without damages for the withholding thereof." This section is
74
known as the modernized action of replevin.
The final substantively oriented category is section 10701(7), which allows joinder of all causes arising out of "claims
against a trustee by virtue of a contract or by operation of law."
This provision is intended to provide sufficient scope for a single
suit against a trustee to include all the breaches of the fiduciary
duty that might occur.
It is unfortunate that the Field Code drafters felt compelled
to carry over the unworkable principles of common law joinder.
Four years after its adoption in New York, the Field Code joinder
provision was amended to include the equity practice of the
transaction class, mitigating the harsh limitations of the original
six categories. The narrowness of the original Field Code joinder
provision became apparent quite early. Some states wisely refused to adopt the substantive categorization approach. For example, the Iowa Code Commissioners in 1880 remarked:
[T]he only question of joinder with us rests upon policy. This
chiefly concerns the plaintiff, and he should be left to his own
sense, in guiding him either to unite a slander suit with a promissory note, or keep them distinct. The court can, if it likes,
order cases, the joinder of which it doesn't favor, to be disunited
71. P. Buss, supra note 6, §§ 129, 131.
72. S.C. COD ANN. § 10-701(5) (1962).
73. P. Buss, supra note 6, § 132. See also J. POMEROY, supra note 48, § 332, at 50814.
74. J. POMEROY, supra note 48, § 333, at 176.
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and tried separately. The English Commissioners on this subject, say that the good sense of the plaintiff will be a better guide
than can any rule, to determine what causes should be united."
The modern approach of rejecting the category concept and of
giving the plaintiff wide discretion as to what claims should be
joined is represented in rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Prodecure. 5
C.

Limitations on Joinder: Statutory Requirements
Section 10-701 further restricts the scope of joinder by stat-

ing:
But the causes of action so united must (a) all belong to one of
these classes, (b) except in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages, affect all the parties to the action, (c) not require different places of trial and (d) be separately stated.77
1. The One-Class Requirement
Subsection (a) represents one of the simpler, more predictable inquiries under the joinder provision. Unfortunately, the oneclass limitation can easily be abused. For example, Bateman v.
Wymojo Yarn Mills" held that causes of action in slander, malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, and trespass
upon property could not be joined because they fell within two of
the seven categories: The court could have avoided this absurd
result and satisfied the one-class limitation by analyzing joinder
under the transaction class.7"
The court demonstrated its judicial myopia once again in
Sharkey v. Ehrich.0 The plaintiffs, a committee representing the
depositors of the defunct Bank of Georgetown, sought to recover
from an individual defendant, Mrs. Cornelia C. Ehrich, the
amount of her statutory liability as a bank stockholder and to set
aside certain fraudulent land conveyances made to A.S.
Ehrich, another individual defendant. In sustaining the demurrer
75. ABA

SPEC. COMM. ON IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL ADMINIS-

A, 41, 46-48 (1942) (Collected).
76. See note 176 infra.
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-701 (1962).
78. 155 S.C. 388, 152 S.E. 675 (1930).
79. See Record, vol. 77, at 1. Bateman v. Wymojo Yarn Mills, 155 S.C. 388, 152 S.E.
675 (1930).
80. 160 S.C. 489, 159 S.E. 371 (1931).
TRATION MONOGRAPHS, Series
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on the basis of misjoinder, the court concluded that the causes of
action violated the "one-class" feature of the joinder rule but
failed to give any reasons for this conclusion. 8' The court could
have reasonably determined that the cause of action alleging statutory liability fell within the "contract, express or implied"
class,8" and the action alleging a fraudulent conveyance should
have been categorized as "claims to recover real property." 83 Further analysis reveals that joinder should have been permitted
under the transaction class. Although the events supporting the
allegation of statutory liability may be accurately characterized
as a single transaction, joinder is also proper when all the causes
of action arise out of transactions connected with the same subject of action. The plaintiffs could have attacked the conveyances
as fraudulent by first establishing Mrs. Ehrich's statutory liability. A jury finding that the statutory liability claim failed would
have extinguished the underlying basis for setting aside the conveyances, thus terminating the dispute. When an interdependency exists between the two causes of action, there is no justification in stipulating a separate lawsuit for the fraudulent conveyance claim. 84 An earlier case85 suggests that the court may solve
81. The court made this observation:
The cause of action alleged against Mrs. Ehrich is her statutory liability as a
stockholder, clearly an action at law. The cause of action alleged against both
defendants is the setting aside as fraudulent certain conveyances from Mrs.
Ehrich to A.S. Ehrich, clearly a suit in equity.
Id. at 495, 159 S.E. at 373.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-701(2) (1962).
83. Id. § 10-701(5). In a technical sense, only the latter cause involved A.S. Erich and
the court apparently relies on this fact in asserting "tihe defendant A.S. Ehrich is not
at all concerned in the cause of action against Mrs. Ehrich." Sharkey v. Ehrich, 160 S.C.
489, 495, 159 S.E. 371, 373 (1931). These remarks indicate that the court may be relying
on another statutory limitation to joinder, section 10-701(b), providing that the causes of
action affect all the parties. See text accompanying notes 90-107 infra.
84. This is essentially the same procedure employed in suits in which a creditor may
sue his debtor to obtain a judgment on the debt and ask within the same action to have
the debtor's fraudulent conveyances set aside. To effectuate full recovery, the grantees are
joined as party defendants. See Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in
North Carolina, 25 N.C.L. REV. 1, 19 (1946).
85. The court in Capell v. Shuler, 105 S.C. 75, 89 S.E. 813 (1916), interpreted the
transaction clause to be broad enough to include a variety of claims. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant Shuler had trespassed on plaintiffs land and wrongfully removed his
storehouse and certain other personalty. He further alleged that the co-defendant Rembert
owned the land on which the storehouse was then located. Keels, as trustee in bankruptcy
for Shuler, was made a defendant because he was allegedly in possession of the storehouse.
The court not only found there was but one cause of action against all the defendants,
but also made the unusual observation that the cause of action arose out of the same
transaction.
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similar problems by construing the complaint to state only one

cause of action."
Sharkey is a warning. Whenever joinder is attacked under
the "one-class" clause of section 10-701, 87 the plaintiff's attorney
should carefully consider whether a persuasive argument for
transactional joinder exists. When the elements of the controversy are interrelated, Gantt v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp."5
demonstrates that the language "same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action" can be applied
to allow settlement of the entire controversy in one proceeding.
2.

Affect All the Parties

The requirement that the causes of action must "affect" all
the parties to the action has placed an additional burden on the
joining of claims. 9 Although the parties under a traditional approach need not be equally affected, "[t]hey must, however, be
affected in the same capacity, so that a cause affecting one as
[sic] individual cannot be joined with another which affects him
only as an administrator; a cause affecting one jointly with

another cannot be joined with one affecting him singly, and so
on. 8 00 The supreme court in Bennett v. SpartanburgRy., Gas &
86. Problems of delineating the cause or causes of action are generally complex.
Practitioners are advised to investigate the feasibility of solving a question of joinder by
arguing that the complaint states only one cause of action. Because the present joinder
rules operate restrictively, it is suggested that the supreme court, because of its willingness
to pursue a modern policy of procedure despite the outdated statutes, may welcome the
opportunity to reach a sound result through this alternative channel.
87. The court's complete lack of analysis makes it difficult to determine the relative
weight it gives to certain factors. Whether the case was decided on the basis of the "oneclass" clause or on the basis of the requirement that the parties be "affected" or both is
uncertain, After mentioning both requirements, the court simply says, "[t]his ground of
demurrer should have been sustained." Sharkey v. Ehrich, 160 S.C. 489, 496, 159 S.E. 371,
373 (1931). It is indeed unfortunate that the court fails to analyze the issues. This practice
breeds unnecessary litigation and confuses lawyers and judges alike.
88. 254 S.C. 112, 173 S.E.2d 658 (1970).
89. The exact wording of the statute is: "But the causes of action so united must...
(b) except in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages, affect all the parties to the action
." No effort has been made to deal with foreclosures. The following statutes pertain
to foreclosures: S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-81 et seq. (1962).
90. C. CLARK, supra note 6, § 68, at 445; see P. Buss, supra note 6, § 123.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has dealt with the import of this requirement in
numerous cases. The review of cases is limited to those in which the court has specifically
applied the statutory requirement that the parties be "affected" by the united causes.
Certain cases have discussed joinder in the case of multiple defendants without regard to
this requirement. See Suber v. Allen, 13 S.C. 317 (1880) (joinder under the transaction
class),
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Electric Co."1 held that the plaintiff administrator's cause of action for personal injuries of the deceased92 and the cause of action
for wrongful death9" were misjoined for failure to affect all the
parties to the action. Refusing to recognize that the administrator
was a party to both actions,94 the court adopted the narrow view
that the administrator represented two distinct legal entities. The
cause of action by the administrator for personal injuries on behalf of the estate was said not to "affect" the administrator as
representative of the wrongful death beneficiaries, and the cause
of action brought on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries
was said not to "affect" the administrator as the representative
of the estate.95
This reasoning cannot withstand the challenges of a modern
procedural system. The inflexibility of the statute could easily be
circumvented by construing "affect all the parties" to mean only
that the actions should have some effect on the parties. The court
would then turn its attention to the important consideration of
whether the factual situation justifies settling the suit in one
proceeding. In a case like Bennett, in which the causes of action
arise out of the same transaction, such an approach imposes no
injustice on the parties. Contrary to the view expressed in
Bennett, a need for separate lawsuits does not necessarily follow
from a need for separate verdicts and judgments. The argument
91. 97 S.C. 27, 81 S.E. 189 (1914).
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-209 (1962) provides:
Causes of action for and in respect to any and all injuries and trespasses to
and upon real estate and any and all injuries to the person or to personal
property shall survive both to and against the personal or real representative,
as the case may be, of a deceased person and the legal representative of an
insolvent person or a defunct or insolvent corporation, any law or rule to the
contrary notwithstanding.
93. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1951 to-1956 (1962).
94. Section 10-209 states that the action for personal injuries survives to the "personal or real representative" and § 10-1952 provides that the wrongful death action is to
be "brought by or in the name of the executor or administrator of such person."
95. The recovery under the survival action belongs to the estate because the action
is considered an enforceable personal right of the deceased. The proceeds become subject
to claims of creditors because they are added to the other assets of the estate. On the other
hand, the recovery for wrongful death belongs to the statutory beneficiaries and is not
subject to payment of the decedent's debts. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1954 (1962). Boyd v.
Richie, 159 S.C. 55, 155 S.E. 844 (1930). Under § 10-1952 the existence of statutory
beneficiaries must be affirmatively alleged in an action for wrongful death. Otherwise, the
complaint is demurrable. Kitchen v. Southern Ry., 68 S.C. 554, 48 S.E. 4 (1904).
96. See Wiesenfeld, Stem & Co. v. Byrd, 17 S.C. 106 (1881); Susong v. Vaiden, 10
S.C. 247 (1878); Trimmier v. Thompson, 10 S.C. 164 (1877). See also Annot., 67 A.L.R.
625 (1930). The damages in the § 10-209 actions are those accruing between the time of
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for settling the dispute in one proceeding under the circumstances
is persuasive not only because both actions emerge from one
transaction but also because both involve the same burden of
proof, as well as substantially the same evidence. Furthermore,
the interest in avoiding inconsistent factual determinations
would be satisfied by eliminating an additional proceeding.
Under present South Carolina law, however, the factual conclusions of the wrongful death action or whichever action was tried
first would not be res judicata in a subsequent survival action. 7
One additional observation should be made: section 10-701
is not a rule of mandatory joinder. The plaintiff at his discretion
may bring his causes of action at different times in his different
capacities. The plaintiff administrator in Bennett voluntarily
joined the survival action with the wrongful death action in an
attempt to conclude both in one proceeding. As a matter of strategy, however, the plaintiff's attorney may advise his client to
institute the actions separately, effectively giving him two distinct opportunities to win. If the first action is unsuccessful, the
plaintiff may pursue the second suit in a different capacity; if he
wins the first suit, the possibilities of a favorable settlement in
the second suit are enhanced. The defendant might object to the
joinder initially, either as a delaying tactic or as an attempt to
minimize the risk of loss in the first suit. Regardless of the tactical
maneuvers of the defendant, when the plaintiff-administrator
joins the wrongful death action with the survival action, the defendant should not be able to insist that they be instituted separately. Two arguments support this view. First, the plaintiffadministrator should be considered as a single party having two
distinct causes of action, an approach satisfying section 10-701 by
having but one party affected. Second, since the plaintiffinjury and the time of death. Thus, it is said that no recovery is possible when there has
been no conscious pain and suffering, Croft v. Hall, 208 S.C. 187, 37 S.E.2d 537 (1946),
which really means that if the injury and death occur simultaneously there are simply no
damages. On the other hand, under § 10-1954, damages depend on the "injury resulting
from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action
shall be brought." Consequently, when the deceased has died instantaneously, the administrator will usually abandon the survival action altogether.
97. Peoples v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 115 S.C. 115, 104 S.E. 541 (1920) settled this
precise issue. The court cited Bennett v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 97 S.C.
27, 81 S.E. 189 (1914) as the controlling authority. Although the result is correct, the
absence of further analysis is unfortunate. The approach taken in Peoples is in accord with
the general rule that a party acting in substantially different capacities in separate actions
is not bound in the second action by the judgment of the first. See F. JAMES, supra note
6, § 11.24, at 585-86. See also Lide, ResJudicatain South Carolina, 4 S.C.L.Q. 333 (1952).
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administrator is considered to be suing in different representative
capacities, he is affected by the causes of action in each of his
capacities sufficiently to warrant joinder. For example, the
plaintiff-administrator could establish that as a representative of
either the estate or the statutory beneficiaries he would be prejudiced in a second suit by the practical difficulties of trying essentially the same case a second time. A more cogent reason is that,
because the same degree of proof is necessary to impose liability
in each cause of action, joining the actions causes the plaintiffadministrator to be sufficiently "affected" in his different capacities to warrant joinder.
Capell v. Shuler" and Darby v. Southern Ry.99 offer inconsistent interpretations of the requirement that all parties be affected by the causes of action. In Capell °° the complaint seemed
to style multiple causes of action in trespass against the codefendants. The court, however, viewed the complaint as one
cause of action, holding that the co-defendants who participated
in the fruits of the trespass would be affected if the plaintiff were
entitled to recover against those who initiated the trespass.' 1 In
Darby, the plaintiff had transferred his baggage to the joint agent
of the defendants Southern Railway and Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad, receiving in return a parcel check. Hours later, he purchased a ticket from Atlantic Coast Line's agent to travel from
Camden to Sumter and exchanged his parcel check for a baggage
check. After arriving at his destination he discovered property
had been removed from his baggage. Because his claim was not
paid in thirty days, the plaintiff also had the right to sue Atlantic
Coast Line for a statutory penalty of $50.00. The complaint stated
three causes of action: one, for loss under the parcel check while
the defendants' joint agent had possession of the baggage; another, for loss under the baggage check while Atlantic Coast Line
had possession; and the third, for recovery of the statutory penalty from Atlantic Coast Line. Failing to adopt Capell's flexible
construction of "affect," the court held that the second and third
causes of action did not affect Southern Railway. If the plaintiff
had proved his second or third causes of action, Southern Railway's liability would have been terminated. Under the simplistic,
98. 105 S.C. 75, 89 S.E. 813 (1916).
99. 108 S.C. 145, 93 S.E. 716 (1917).
100. The facts in this case are given in note 85 supra.
101. Capell indicates that only one cause of action was involved, but clearly multiple
causes were contained in the complaint.
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broad reasoning of Capel, this result would have been sufficient
to find all the parties affected and thus properly joined. The court
in fact used this reasoning in Lorick & Lowrance, Inc. v. Heslep.'°2
The complaint stated two alternative causes of action, the first
against a partnership entity and the second against an individual
partner. The defendants demurred on the grounds that the partner was not named in the second cause of action and therefore was
unaffected by it. The court observed that it was the disposition
of the second cause of action that affected the unnamed partner.
If the second cause of action failed, then the unnamed partner,
through the partnership, would be both subject to liability and
affected by the second cause of action."0 3
1 the plaintiff
In Cooper v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co., 04
sued to recover the amount of an unsatisfied judgment from two
insurance companies who had issued policies to her judgment
debtor covering the same risk.15 The court recognized that the
defendants were not jointly liable to the plaintiff because
breaches of the alleged third party beneficiary contracts had to
be established against each defendant. Notwithstanding the absence of joint liability, the court determined that the defendants
were affected by both
causes of action through operation of the
06
rule of contribution.'

With the current emphasis on liberally construing the language of the joinder statute, it is unlikely that the court will
102. 112 S.C. 375, 99 S.E. 835 (1919).
103. Id. at 377, 99 S.E. at 835.
The pendulum swung back in Sharkey v. Ehrich, 160 S.C. 489, 159 S.E. 871 (1931),
in which one defendant was sued for her alleged statutory liability as a stockholder in an
insolvent bank and the other defendant was sued as the alleged fraudulent grantee of land
from the first defendant. The plaintiffs sought recovery of damages and an order setting
aside the conveyance. The court held that the alleged fraudulent grantee was unaffected
by the action for the statutory penalty. The court apparently ignored the simple fact that
if the plaintiffs had failed to establish their right to recover the statutory penalty, any
alleged fraud in the land transfer would have been ipso facto negated. Conversely, it
ignored the fact that a right to recover the statutory penalty would establish the plaintiff's
related right to contest transfers of property as fraudulent.
104. 244 S.C. 286, 136 S.E.2d 774 (1964).
105. What the court referred to as "coinsurance" is actually more properly labeled
"contributive insurance." Under contributive insurance, the losses are prorated among all
the insurers according to their respective liabilities. See 3 G. RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURA CE
§ 538 (5th ed. W. Freedman 1952). Coinsurance generally refers to the "relative division
of liability between the insured and the insurer as respects the risk involved, dependent
upon the relative amount of the insurance policy and the actual cash value of the insured
at the time of loss." 2 G. RrcHARDS, supra § 178.
106. 244 S.C. 286, 292-93, 136 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1964).
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rigidly apply the word "affect." Cooper reiterates the rule of construction that the parties need not be affected in like manner.
When the plaintiff voluntarily joins causes of action he could
otherwise have instituted separately and they rationally fall
within the transaction class, the court will probably be reluctant
to refuse the opportunity to have the rights of the parties adjudicated in one proceeding.
3.

Place of Trial and Separate Statement

The remaining two statutory restrictions on joinder of causes
pose no difficulty. The third requirement that causes of action be
triable in the same place' 7 neither adds to nor takes away from
the settled venue principles." 8 The last requirement is that the
causes be stated separately. If the causes of action fail to meet
this requirement, the proper remedy is a motion to state them
separately. 0 9 Refusal of the motion touches the merits of the
litigation and consequently constitutes grounds for appeal,"10 but
the failure to object constitutes a waiver."' When the causes are
not stated separately and also are misjoined, the proper remedy
'2
is a demurrer."
The requirement that the causes of action be separately
stated is collaterally related to another problem in pleading
107. The operation of a venue defect in a wills case involving multiple causes is well
illustrated by Irby v. Kidder, 226 S.C. 396, 85 S.E.2d 405 (1955).
108. See C. CLARK, supra note 6, § 68, at 447.
The general venue provisions are S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-301 to -311 (1962). Because
specialized venue provisions are interspersed throughout the code, practitioners are advised to always refer to the general index of the code.
109. A motion to state the causes of action separately can be made under section 10701. However, South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Mutual Inv. Co., 150 S.C. 365, 148 S.E. 213
(1929) indicates that the same results can be achieved by motion to make the complaint
more definite under section 10-606, which states:
If irrelevant or redundant matter be inserted in a pleading it may be stricken
out on a motion of any person aggrieved thereby. And when the allegations of a
pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the charge or
defense is not apparent the court may require the pleading to be made definite
and certain by amendment.
In South CarolinaNational,plaintiff sued to foreclose on four separate pieces of property,
each of which was subject to an individual mortgage. The court held that the four causes
of action should have been separately stated in the complaint. See also Cooper v. Georgia
Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 S.C. 286, 136 S.E.2d 774 (1964).
110. See, e.g., Matheson v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 S.C. 297, 302, 118 S.E. 617,
618 (1923).
111. Fowler v. Floyd, 204 S.C. 118, 28 S.E.2d 641 (1944).
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-642 (1962).
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caused by the misinterpretation of section 10-679,13 commonly
referred to as the "jumbling act." The pleader's pitfall has been
in confusing the differences between "acts of negligence or other
wrongs," as used in section 10-679, and the fundamental term
"cause of action." Hopkins v. Shuman"' illustrates this confusion.'"' The plaintiff opposed a motion to compel him to state
separately the causes of action, contending only one cause was
stated. The court held that section 10-679 permitted a single
statement alleging several acts of negligence contributing to an
injury but did not authorize "jumbling" causes of action.' 6
D. Joinder of Causes and Parties:Multifaceted Litigation
One would hope that interpretations of the joinder of causes
provision in multiparty contexts would not operate to defeat the
underlying purposes of party joinder provisions." 7 Such conflicts
will only frustrate the effective workings of a procedural system
whether it be the more modern federal system or the Field Code
of South Carolina. The 1966 amendments to federal rule 18(a)
were directed to the elimination of potential inconsistencies in
the operation of party and claim joinder provisions
by making certain that once parties are properly joined any
party asserting a claim (whether it be an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim) may join as many
113. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-679 (1962) states:

When two or more acts of negligence or other wrongs are set forth in the complaint as causing or contributing to the injury for which the suit is brought, the
party plaintiff in such suit shall not be required to state such several acts
separately nor shall such party be required to elect upon which he will go to trial,
but he shall be entitled to submit his whole case to the jury under the instruction
of the court and to recover such damages as he has sustained, whether such
damages arose from one or another or all of such acts or wrongs alleged in the
complaint.
114. 235 S.C. 191, 110 S.E.2d 713 (1959).
115. Other cases illustrate this point equally well. See, e.g., Matheson v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 S.C. 297, 302-03, 118 S.E. 617, 618 (1923).
116. Fortunately, the plaintiff was given leave to amend the complaint. Contrast this
disposition with the statement in Black v. B.B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 115, 155
S.E. 268, 269 (1930), that "[w]here the plaintiff jumbles two or more separate and
distinct causes of action in one complaint, a motion to require him to elect upon which
cause of action he will proceed to trial is proper." Clearly, the court did not intend this
statement to be accepted at face value. When the causes of action, although stated together, are otherwise joinable under section 10-701, the proper motion is one to require
that they be separately stated. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-606 (1962).
117. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-202 (plaintiffs), -203 (defendants), -205 (representative plaintiffs or defendants) (1962).
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claims as he has against an opposing party or parties even
though they arise out of different transactions and do not involve5 questions of law or fact that are common to all the parties."
As a practical matter, what may be proper initial joinder is subject to a finding that party convenience or avoidance of prejudice

mandates the separate treatment of claims."'
An analysis of the multiparty cases shows that the South
Carolina procedural system's slavish adherence to substantive
divisions of claim joinder is perpetuated in the party joinder
area '20 by requiring that causes of action "affect all the parties to
the action." This approach not only irrationally restricts the proper scope of party joinder, but also causes joinder provisions to
work against each other.
Restrictive joinder was not exhibited in equitable actions in
which court policies of molding relief and bringing in all interested parties for a complete adjudication overrode substantive
characterizations of party interests."' Unfortunately, unification
of equitable and legal practices in a single code system did not
eradicate inflexible pre-code legal joinder practices.
Hellams v. Switzer,1 22 an action by adjacent land owners for
property damages caused by defendant's dam, illustrates the
cross-purpose operation of the joinder provisions. After concluding that there was but one cause of action in which all plaintiffs
had an interest, the court proceeded to question "[w]hether the
several plaintiffs, owning the different parcels of land claimed to
be damaged, could be united in one joint action. 1 '

23

Under pre-

118. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1583, at 798
(1971).
119. Id. § 1586. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
120. Sons v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 170 S.C. 548, 171 S.E.35 (1933); Ryder
v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 121 S.C. 72, 113 S.E. 474 (1922); Hellams v. Switzer, 24 S.C. 39

(1885).
121. Bishop v. Bishop, 164 S.C. 493, 497, 162 S.E. 756, 757 (1931). For cases demonstrating liberal joinder in equitable actions, see Pate v. Thomas, 262 S.C. 365, 204 S.E.2d
571 (1974); Kelly v. Tiner, 91 S.C. 41, 74 S.E. 30 (1912) (injunctive relief); and Singleton
v. Singleton, 232 S.C. 441, 102 S.E.2d 747 (1958); Stallings v. Barrett, 26 S.C. 474, 2 S.E.
483 (1886); Tucker v. Tucker, 13 S.C. 318 (1860) (actions for accounting by distributees).
Compare Black v. Simpson, 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1025 (1912) with Kickbush v. Ruggles,
105 S.C. 525, 90 S.E. 163 (1916) (shareholder actions).
122. 24 S.C. 39 (1885). See C. CLARK, supra note 6, § 57, at 365-67; Brandis,
Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N.C.L. REV. 1, 30-32
(1946).
123. Id. at 43.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

code practice, two or more plaintiffs, with separate and distinct
rights in parcels of land claimed to have been injured by the same
physical cause, would have been misjoined. This rule did not
settle the misjoinder question under the code, as the court had'
to inquire further whether the statute changed pre-code practice.
The permissive joinder section states that "[a]ll persons having
an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief
demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs .
"...
"I4 Finding no
change, Hellams took the position that a tort affecting a number
of persons without causing "joint" injury and "joint" damages
necessitated separate actions. 125 Superficially, separate actions
followed by reasoning that "an interest. . . in obtaining the relief
demanded" required that each plaintiff have an interest in all the
recoveries of other plaintiffs. This view is analogous to a restrictive interpretation of the joinder of claims section, which requires
that such causes of action similarly "affect" all parties. 2 ' Originally, the inclusion of the language "affect" or "interested in"
was intended to ensure some sort of relationship which would
justify treatment of the parties in a single suit. Since these requirements are a vestige of the early code preoccupation with
substantive characterizations, taken to an illogical extreme, they
defeat procedural policy. 2'
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-202 (1962).
125. 24 S.C. 47.48, quoting J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 231 (1st ed. 1875).
126. Hellams would also have followed from a restrictive definition of cause of action

which states that a right of action be regarded as a separate cause of action so that each
plaintiff is legally interested in his own cause of action only and not affected by causes of

action of others. Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 121 S.C. 72, 113 S.E. 474 (1922). But see
Capell v. Shuler, 105 S.C. 75, 89 S.E. 813 (1916), discussed at note 85 supra, in which an
unlawful taking by one and detaining by another created a single cause.

The Hellams rationale also holds for defendant joinder. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-203
(1962). In Hines v. Jarrett, 26 S.C. 480, 25 S.E.343 (1887), another adjacent landowners
dam situation, the facts changed to present a single plaintiff and two defendants. After
one defendant conveyed his interest to the other and the dam was not removed, the

plaintiff brought his damage suit. Joinder of causes was held improper as the action for
continuing the tort did not "affect" the action against the two defendants for initial
damages. There would have been no problem if plaintiff has sued for injunctive relief. See
Pate v. Thomas, 262 S.C. 365, 204 S.E.2d 571 (1974).
127. South Carolina courts usually discuss party joinder in terms of substantive

rights. For example, in Bishop v. Bishop, 164 S.C. 493, 162 S.E. 756 (1931), the court
remarked that

"[tihe important inquiry in actions at law is with respect to the rights of the individual
parties involved. The aim is to see that no party is deprived of a substantial right which

he can show he is entitled to under the law."
Id. at 497, 162 S.E. at 757. Beyond transactional class discussion, rarely is a finding of
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Under the federal approach, 2 ' all parties may join or be
joined if the rights asserted by or against them arise out of the
same transaction, or series of transactions, and if any question of
law or fact common to all will arise. The plaintiffs or defendants
need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the
relief requested and the judgment is in accordance with each
party's rights or liabilities.12 In a Hellams context, joinder would
be proper although there may be different damage determinations and defenses to be tried separately.
Hellams' adoption of the pre-code legal practices has had a
stultifying effect on modern joinder, since it has blocked consolidation (even when it has been warranted by economy, efficiency
and absence of prejudice13 ) and inhibited innovative group remedy procedures such as the class suit."' Occasionally a seemingly
less restrictive view of party joinder appears. In Cooper v. Georgia
Casualty & Surety Co.,132 an executrix attempted to enforce judgment of a prior auto collision suit against two insurance companies. The lower court found joinder improper. The supreme court
noted that, since the different policies covered the same risk and
proof of failure to perform one would not establish failure in the
performance of the other, "separate" rights of action would arise.
The court, however, held party joinder was proper as each insurer
was affected by the cause of action against the other because of
the contribution rule and the need to establish primary and secondary liability. Unfortunately, the Cooper holding is limited to
factual settings giving rise to interrelated liability suits in which
misjoinder justified in terms of procedural findings of prejudice or potential jury confusion. Cf. Piper v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.

129. To a degree, even the federal system exhibited restrictive practices in cases
coming under the pre-1966 amendment joinder provisions. For example, in Federal Housimg Adm'r v. Christianson, 26 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1939) the plaintiff sued three
endorsees of one note, joining a second claim on a different note against two of the original
endorsees. Joinder of the claims was held improper as the second claim did not involve a
transaction common to all - reasoning remarkably similar to the "affects all" doctrine
of the Field Code. The Advisory Committee in Advisory Committee Note, ProposedRules
of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.69, 86-7 (1966) as well as criticizing Christianson,emphasized
that party joinder of rule 20 and claim joinder of rule 18(a) were independent inquiries so
that once party joinder was declared proper on any claim, separate claims against any
party properly joined could be presented as long as separate treatment was not justified
on findings of potential prejudice or inconvenience.
130. McKinney v. Greenville Ice & Fuel Co., 232 S.C.257, 101 S.E.2d 659 (1958).
131. Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973).
132. 244 S.C. 286, 136 S.E.2d 774 (1964).
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the extent of each party's liability is interdependent.lu
What was obvious in Cooper to the South Carolina Supreme
Court was the interrelatedness of the insurance contracts, but
such interrelatedness is not so obvious in multiparty contexts in
the initial stages of litigation. Inquiry under Cooper would entail
speculation about the exact relationship between claims sought
to be joined-a needless, delaying and wasteful enterprise rejected by the federal approach.
E. Judicial Restriction on Joinder: The Rule of Consistent
Pleading
A further limitation on the scope of litigation is the courtimposed rule of pleading, stating that the causes of action "must
be consistent with each other-that is, one cause of action, if
valid, should not show the others to be bad."' 34 The rule is frequently mentioned in connection with the doctrine of election of
remedies.'35 A good illustration of the operation of the rule is
Walker v. McDonald"' in which the complaint united two separately stated causes of action. The complaint alleged that the
defendant, through fraudulent and deceitful representations, induced the plaintiff to invest money in a partnership between
them and requested as relief damages amounting to one-half the
value of the partnership. A second cause of action requested an
accounting of the partnership business and a sum of money
claimed to be the plaintiff's share of the partnership's net profits.
The supreme court subsequently found the action for fraud and
deceit inconsistent with the action for accounting after determining that the former repudiated the contract of partnership,
whereas the latter affirmed it. The court observed that if the
causes had been instituted separately the independent doctrine
13
of election of remedies would have been applicable. 1
133. Kline v. City of Columbia, 249 S.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 597 (1967). Again joinder
seems to depend on a need grounded in substantive liability determinations, not on
general policy considerations of a procedural system.
134. P. Buss, supra note 6, § 122, at 163. Walker v. McDonald, 136 S.C. 231, 235,
134 S.E. 222, 223 (1926), quotes this rule approvingly.
135. Walker v. McDonald, 136 S.C. 231, 235-36, 134 S.E. 222, 223 (1926).
136. 136 S.C. 231, 134 S.E. 222 (1926).
137. The rule against pleading inconsistent causes of action must be distinguished
from the rule of election of remedies for they are distinctly different concepts. The operation of the first rule is Wvell illustrated by Walker. This judicially created requirement is
intended to eliminate factual inconsistencies in a complaint alleging multiple causes. On
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As Walker points out, when only one recovery is requested
and doubt exits with respect to the nature of the evidence, the
3 8 The crucial
plaintiff may plead inconsistent causes of action."
the other hand, the rule of election of remedies is invoked when the plaintiff seeks to
enforce inconsistent remedies. McMahan v. McMahan, 122 S.C. 336, 115 S.E. 293 (1922),
is a "garden variety" election of remedies case.
The scope of the rule of election of remedies is much broader than the consistent
pleading rules. McMahan makes this statement:
The doctrine of election of remedies is regarded as being an application of
the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot in the assertion of his
right occupy inconsistent positions in relation to the facts which form the basis
of his respective remedies; it is based on the proposition that, when a party has
two remedies proceeding upon opposite and irreconcilable claims of right, the
one adopted excludes the other.
The so-called "inconsistency of remedies" is not an inconsistency between
the remedies themselves, for this may often happen when the same facts are
relied upon as the basis of the several alternative remedies; but it means that a
certain state of facts relied upon as the basis of a certain remedy is inconsistent
with and repugnant to another certain state of facts relied upon as the basis of
another remedy.
If a party should invoke a remedy appropriate to a certain state of facts,
and there should exist another remedy appropriate to a different state of facts,
inconsistent with and repugnant to the first state of facts, his invocation of the
first remedy is an election which by the bare commencement of the action will
bar his right to invoke the other remedy.
122 S.C. at 341-42, 115 S.E. at 294-95.
McMahan is careful to distinguish the case in which alternative, but consistent,
remedies exist from the case in which truly inconsistent remedies are involved. In reference to the former, the court makes this statement:
When a certain state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative
remedies, both founded upon the identical state of facts, these remedies are not
considered inconsistent remedies, though they may not be able to "stand together" the enforcement of the one remedy being a satisfaction of the party's
claim. In such case the invocation of the one remedy is not an election which
will bar the other, unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the
stage of final adjudication, or unless by the invocation of the remedy first sought
to be enforced the plaintiff shall have gained an advantage thereby or caused
detriment or change of situation to the other.
Id. at 342, 115 S.E. at 295.
As these excerpts illustrate, the rule of election of remedies has numerous applications. The problems that concern the rule tend to be somewhat complex in comparison to
other procedural areas. Thoughtful planning by the plaintiff's attorney before the institution of litigation should eliminate the sticky questions associated with election of remedies. For a brief but concise discussion, see C. CLARK, supra note 6, § 77.
138. 136 S.C. at 235, 134 S.E. at 223. Relevant to this point is American Equity Life
Ins. Co. v. Miller, 248 S.C. 107, 149 S.E.2d 331 (1966). In this case the complaint stated
a cause of action for violation of the usury statute and a cause of action for fraud. In the
first, the plaintiff insurance company alleged the defendant had deposited $100,000 in the
plaintiff's account, taking as security an irrevocable assignment of the same account. The
plaintiff also alleged that the defendant within sixty days of the deposit received usurious
interest of $6,242. Damages in double the amount of interest were requested. In the second
cause of action the plaintiff alleged the defendant and plaintiff's officer conspired to
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question, however, is whether the rule is justified. Federal rule
8(e)(2) discards the requirement of consistent pleadings:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. Aparty may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether
based on legal, equitable, or maritime grounds. All statements
shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.111
Fostering maximum flexibility in pleading, federal rule
8(e)(2) operates more fairly and more realistically than South
Carolina state pleading rules. The difference between the state
and federal positions is a fundamental one because the systems
have radically different concepts of the role of pleading. Federal
pleading has been described as "notice pleading," whereas the
phrase "fact pleading" is generally used in referring to the code
system of pleading. The code procedure compels the plaintiff to
have substantially all the facts at his fingertips prior to drafting
defraud the plaintiff by enabling the officer to prepare a false financial statement. Actual
and punitive damages were requested. The court considered it unnecessary to question
whether the causes of action were inconsistent by holding that the exception to the rule
of consistent pleading applied:
[W]e then have a clear case for the proper application of the rule that a
plaintiff may set up entirely inconsistent causes of action when the pleader is
uncertain as to what the evidence may disclose and when only one recovery is
sought. In view of the serious charges contained in the complaint against the
corporate officer involved in the transaction, it is certainly clearly inferable, if
not perfectly obvious, that such officer is not available as a cooperative witness
and that consequently, there is grave doubt on the part of the plaintiff as to what
the evidence may disclose. As between the parties to this action the precise facts
of the transaction between the defendant and such corporate officer would appear to be peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.
Id. at 110-11, 149 S.E.2d at 32.
139. For a discussion of FED. R. Civ. P. 11, see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
118, §§ 1331-35. The relevant portion of rule 11 states:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading
is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may
be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading
had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
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his pleading. By forcing him to operate under a handicap when
the facts are unobtainable, the system causes the plaintiff to file
his suit "in the dark" and hope discovery will be allowed. The
code system's emphasis on factual consistency, or as Judge Clark
points out, "truth-pleading,' ' I is unwarranted because of frequent doubts concerning the character and nature of the evidence. The goal of notice pleading, on the other hand, is to inform
the opposing party and the court of the nature of the complaint;
maximum flexibility is achieved by requiring only that the plaintiff's attorney plead what he in good faith believes to be true.'"
Confusion often has accompanied the application of the "inconsistency" rule. For example, in Cline v. Southern Ry.,14 the
complaint stated a cause of action for breach of a parol employment contract together with a cause of action for fraudulent inducement in the making of the contract. The first cause of action
affirmed the existence of the contract, while the second repudiated it. The court stated: "[w]ithout any verbal and lengthy
discussions of the words of the Code of Procedure, or of the cases,
the two causes of action pleaded are so allied in substance and
in time and in parties as to make them so akin as to be tried
' 3
together.'
Cline's finding of consistency is difficult to reconcile with the
result in Walker v. McDonald, 4 The Walker complaint alleged
fraudulent inducement in the making of a partnership agreement
and requested as well an accounting. The court determined that
the first cause repudiated the agreement while the second affirmed it. As mentioned previously, Walker in dicta had approved
pleading inconsistent causes when only one recovery was sought
and when the facts were uncertain. 4 5 The plaintiff in Cline sought
only one recovery, but there was no uncertainty in the facts; the
complaint had clearly stated the facts in considerable detail.'
140. C. CLAR, supra note 6, § 68, at 449-50. In South Carolina verification of the
pleadings, which is not always required, constitutes an affirmation of their truthfulness.
See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-603 to -605 (1962).
141. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
142. 110 S.C. 534, 96 S.E. 532 (1917). See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra for
further discussion of this case.

143.
144.
145.
146.
The

Id. at 555-56, 96 S.E. at 538.
136 S.C. 231, 134 S.E. 222 (1926).
See text accompanying note 138 supra.
110 S.C. at 535-40, 96 S.E. at 533-34.
complaint in Stuckey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 195 S.C. 358, 11 S.E.2d 391
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F. Objections to Misjoinder
A demurrer is the appropriate response to a complaint improperly joining several causes of action,'47 and although the
defendant is not compelled to demur, failure to do so constitutes
a waiver of the objection to misjoinder. 8 If the demurrer does not
"distinctly specify the grounds of objection to the complaint,"''
(1940), stated a cause of action for breach of contract together with a cause of action for
fraudulent and deceitful procurement of the same contract. Recognizing that inconsistent
causes constitute misjoinder, the court noted: "Certainly one could not treat a contract
as rescinded and at the same time rely on it as existing, for the assertion of one such cause
of action is necessarily repugnant to the theory upon which the other rests, and to prove
one would be to destroy the other." Id. at 361, 11 S.E.2d at 392. The court then concluded
as a matter of law that the tort claim of fraudulent inducement to contract did not
repudiate the existence of the contract. Id. Notwithstanding that this conclusion terminated the necessity of inquiring into inconsistency of the causes, Cline had noted specifically under almost identical facts that the first cause of action "affirms the contract" and
the second cause of action "disaffirms the contract." 110 S.C. 534, at 551, 554, 96 S.E.
532, at 537, 538. Of course, the net results of Cline and Stuckey are the same, but it should
be made clear whether the result is properly achieved by disregarding the inconsistency
as in Cline or by stating that no inconsistency exists as in Stuckey.
Another case in the Cline, Walker, and Stuckey series is Kneece v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 412, 25 S.E.2d 290 (1943). In Kneece the complaint contained
causes of action for simple breach of a disability insurance contract and for fraudulent
breach of the same contract. The sole question on appeal was whether the causes were
misjoined because they were inconsistent. Stuckey and Cline were cited by the court, but
both were distinguished because the tort in the instant action occurred after the execution
of the contract. Id. at 417, 25 S.E.2d at 292. Kneece is essentially different from the earlier
cases because of the interval between the alleged breaches; therefore, the question still
remains whether an allegation of fraud at the time of execution of a contract repudiates
the contract and negates a cause of action for simple breach. Because Stuckey and Cline
(but not Walker) are cited approvingly by the court in Kneece, it is reasonable to conclude
Stuckey and Cline represent the controlling law. Walker, which Stuckey attempted to
distinguish, has not been overruled expressly, but it is unlikely the court would follow it.
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-642 (1962) states: "The defendant may demur to the complaint when it shall appear upon the face thereof that: . . .Several causes of action have
been improperly united.. . ." S.C. CODE ANN.§ 10-641 (1962) provides in part: "The only
pleading on the part of the defendant is either a demurrer or an answer."
148. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-647 (1962) states:
If no such objection be taken either by demurrer or answer the plaintiff or
defendant shall be deemed to have waived the objection, excepting only an
objection (a) to the jurisdiction of the court, (b) that the complaint does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or (c) that the answer does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.
In cases in which the objection is made that the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or that the answer does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a defense the party making such objection shall give
at least five days' notice in writing to the opposite party of the grounds of such
objection.
149. S.C. COD ANN. § 10-643 (1962) states: "The demurrer shall distinctly specify
the grounds of objection to the complaint. Unless it does so it may be disregarded. It may
be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the alleged causes of action stated therein."
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it may be disregarded. 5 ' Similarly, the pleader must indicate
whether he is demurring to the whole complaint or to specific
causes of action.151
Even if the defendant fails to demur there may be an alternative method of raising the issue of misjoinder. In Latimer v.
Sullivan1' 2 the defendant, after answering, "orally" demurred on
the grounds that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.5 3 The court stated that "under this
demurrer it is urged that the complaint is fatally defective in that
several causes of action have been united without a separate and
distinct statement as to each cause, such as is required under the
new system of pleading .
".1.."54
The defendant succeeded in
having the court adjudicate the question of joinder just as effectively as if he had originally demurred on the grounds of misjoinder. Consequently, Latimer destroys the effectiveness of the
150. Id.

151. Id. In Westlake v. Farrow, 34 S.C. 270, 274, 13 S.E. 469, 470 (1891), the court
said that when the complaint purports to state multiple causes but actually only one cause
is well-stated, the remedy is not a demurrer for misjoinder but a motion to strike the illstated cause as surplusage. Under the code this motion would be made pursuant to section
10-606. Id. See note 116 supra.
Westlake also adopts Pomeroy's suggestion that when multiple causes are contained
in a single statement and the causes are not joinable the proper remedy is a motion to
compel the plaintiff to make the complaint more definite and certain by separately stating
the causes of action, after which a demurrer to the complaint for misjoinder of causes is
proper. 34 S.C. at 274-75, 13 S.E. at 470.
Judge Clark takes the view that an immediate demurrer is proper pleading. C. CLARK,
supra note 6, § 72, at 469.
A further distinction must be made. It seems that a demurrer to the complaint
implies that the causes of action are in fact causes of action.Thus, when one of two alleged
causes is insufficiently stated, a demurrer on grounds of misjoinder cannot be sustained.
Jenkins v. Thomason, 32 S.C. 254, 258, 10 S.E. 961, 963 (1890). See also Westlake v.
Farrow, 34 S.C. 270, 274, 13 S.E. 469, 470 (1891). J. POMEROY, supra note 48, § 342. To be
on the safe side, the defendant should demur on two grounds to protect himself in cases
in which it is difficult to determine whether all causes are well-stated. The demurrer
attacking the sufficiency of the causes of action must be made pursuant to section 10642(6), which allows a demurrer when "[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action." Thus, the problem arises of determining what constitutes a
well-stated cause of action. The problem is made difficult because the code utilizes the
terminology "facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," which implies that the cause
of action is as broad as the facts giving rise to it. Yet, the same facts have supported
multiple causes of action.
152. 30 S.C. 111, 8 S.E. 639 (1889).
153. The objection that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action is not waived by failing to make it by demurrer or by answer. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10-647 (1962). Five days' notice must be given to the other party before making
the objection. Id.
154. 30 S.C. at 113-14, 8 S.E. at 640 (1889).
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waiver provision, section 10-647. It is doubtful that the drafters
of the code intended the defendant to have the advantage of
raising a joinder issue on oral demurrer.
The so-called "motion to elect a cause of action" for trial has
been an additional weapon of the defendant attacking the complaint for misjoinder. The supreme court in Ruff v. Columbia &
Greenville R.R. 55 examined whether the trial court had erred in
granting the defendant's post-answer, pre-trial motion to compel
the plaintiff to elect for trial one of the two stated causes of
action. The court, in holding the motion had been properly
granted, said that it knew of "no law or rule prescribing the time
when such motion should be made, except that, from the very
nature of the motion, it must be before the commencement of the
57
trial."'' A motion of a similar nature arose in Ross v. Jones.
After a mistrial the defendant successfully moved to compel a
separate trial for each of the three causes of action. The court held
that the defendant's failure to demur on grounds of misjoinder
constituted a waiver of objections to the complaint."'8 Ross marks
the outer limit of when the motion can be properly made.
Under Circuit Court Rule 78 the defendant must give written
notice four days before trial if he intends to move that plaintiff
elect a cause of action. 5 ' Such a rule engenders litigation inefficiency on both sides. Even if the circuit court rule is not invoked,
the court may ignore the statutory waiver provision 6 ' and raise
the issue of whether a motion to elect is appropriate. 6 The better
155. 42 S.C. 114, 20 S.E. 27 (1894).
156. Id. at 118, 20 S.E. at 29. See Scott v. McIntosh, 167 S.C. 372, 166 S.E. 345 (1932)
(failure to grant motion to require election on complaint stating both cause of action on
written lease and cause of action in quantum meruit, held reversible error).
157. 47 S.C. 211, 25 S.E. 59 (1896).
158. Separate trials may be ordered by the court when the demurrer for misjoinder
is sustained. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-644 (1962) in part states:
If the demurrer is allowed for the cause mentioned in the fifth item of § 10642 [misjoinder], the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as may
be just, order the action to be divided into as many actions as may be necessary

to the proper determination of the causes of action therein mentioned.
159. S.C. CiR. CT.R. 78 provides:

No motion to require the plaintiff to elect as to which cause of action alleged in
the complaint he will rely on shall be made, unless previous notice thereof in
writing, stating the grounds, is given not less than four days before the hearing.
But if such notice be given the motion may be heard upon the call of the case
for trial or at any time prior thereto.
160. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-647 (1962).
161. Jumper v. Dorchester Lumber Co., 119 S.C. 171, 111 S.E. 881 (1922), involved

a complaint stating three causes of action which relied on inconsistent factual determina-
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rule, as stated by Judge Clark, is that the statutory waiver of
defects in the pleading should be controlling. 112 If an objection is
to be made, a requirement that it be made seasonably enhances
the efficiency of the litigation process. This interpretation reflects
the legislative intent in providing for waiver of objections1 13 and
omitting a rule such as Circuit Court Rule 78.
As in the case of a demurrer, the defendant must specify the
grounds for the motion to elect. When a demurrer is upheld on
grounds that several causes of action are improperly joined, the
court has discretion pursuant to section 10-644 to order separate
6 4 If the court
trials for the respective causes of action."
allows the
joinder issue to be raised by a motion to elect, it is logical that
the court could consider, either at plaintiff's suggestion or sua
sponte, the feasibility of ordering separate trials, which will depend largely upon the nature of the grounds for misjoinder. When
misjoinder is founded on inconsistency in pleading, separate
trials are undesirable because of the possibility of inconsistent
verdicts, 65' such as double satisfaction for a single injury.
Separate trials, however, are feasible when misjoinder is
based on a technical violation of section 10-701. When the causes
of action fail to come within the transaction class and fall within
other categories of section 10-701, separate trials would clearly be
the most convenient, economical and logical method of ending
the controversy. Such an approach would accord with the system
existing in the federal courts. 66 In keeping with the current emtions and requested inconsistent remedies. Because the causes were not separately stated,
the defendant had moved to compel the plaintiff to make the complaint definite and
certain. Even though no objection had been made regarding inconsistency of the causes
of action, the court took the liberty to observe that because it was impossible to determine
on which of the three causes of action the plaintiff intended to rely, the defendant should
move to have the plaintiff elect one cause for trial. This disposition is somewhat unusual
because the defendant received more than he actually requested. If the court had limited
its inquiry to the propriety of the motion for definiteness and certainty in the complaint,
it would have ruled that the causes should be separately stated. But the court anticipated
the attack and remanded the case for the plaintiff to make an election before trial.
The defendant's proper objection would have been a demurrer for misjoinder on
grounds of inconsistency in the causes of action. Walker v. McDonald, 136 S.C. 231, 234,
134 S.E. 222, 224 (1926).
162. C. CLARK, supra note 6, § 72, at 470.
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-647 (1962).
164. See note 158 supra. S.C. Cone ANN. § 10-1202 in part states: "A separate trial
between a plaintiff and any of the several defendants may be allowed by the court whenever, in its opinion, justice will be thereby promoted."
165. Cf. F. JAMES, supra note 6, § 10.4, at 453-54.
166. FED. R. Cirv. P. 42(b) states:
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phasis on efficiency, economy, and the avoidance of unnecessary
litigation, a trial court should terminate the entire dispute. This
procedure should not be objectionable to either the plaintiff who
originally sought to combine the causes of action or the defendant
who is relieved of the possible prejudices of a single trial. Separate
trials can effectively eliminate much of the unnecessary and unreasoned rigidity of the joinder rules.
III.

JOINDER OF CLAIMS UNDER THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

The policy of the joinder rule in federal procedure is to promote convenience and efficiency. Rule 18, "Joinder of Claims and
Remedies," is a clear break from the formalistic code approach.
It states:
A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing party.
Rule 18 gives the federal pleader wide discretion in determining
the content of his lawsuit. It is not a rule of mandatory joinder
61 7
although arguments have been made for such an interpretation.
The federal rules signify a progressive development in the
field of civil procedure, having solved numerous problems that
have frequently arisen under the code approach. Eliminating reference to "cause of action," rule 8(a) uses the terminology "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief . . . ."I" Denominating the cause of action
has been a difficult problem under the code.' 69 Of course, the term
"claim" may be as wrought with confusion as "cause of action,"
but rule 8(e) (2), in conjunction with rule 18(a), seeks to counteract this problem'7 by giving the pleader maximum flexibility at
the pleading stage when the "claim" or "claims" may be illdefined. 7'
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party claims, or issues, always
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
167. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 118, § 1582, at 795 n.32.
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
169. See note 86 supra.
170. See text accompanying note 139 supra for content of FED.R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
171. See notes 139-41 supra and accompanying text.
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If more than one claim exists, allowance of alternate and
hypothetical statements gives the pleader who may not be fully
apprised of the factual elements of the case the benefit of not
being penalized for his lack of knowledge. The joinder rules, with
the aid of liberal discovery, pre'ent mere procedural technicalities from delaying the lawsuit."' Rules of pleading should allow
the parties to sift the elements in dispute promptly and efficiently.
Unlike the code joinder rule, rule 18 contains no limitation
on the classes of claims that may be joined. Even if the transaction class of section 10-701 were broadly interpreted, the rule that
all the parties be affected by the joinder would often eliminate
its utility. Furthermore, cases will arise in which the subject matter of the claims will vary, making joinder impossible. On the
other hand, rule 18 gives the pleader an initial opportunity to
determine the scope of his suit. The operation of res judicata will
frequently encourage the pleader to dispose of all claims in one
lawsuit, and with the advantage of separate trials1 3 a single lawsuit will be desirable, offering the fastest and most efficient vehicle for relief.
IV.

COMMENTARY

The following statement by Professor Sunderland is just as
appropriate today as it was in 1920:
There is a . . . striking failure which must be charged to the
legal profession in America,.

.

. and that is its ignorance of and

indifference to improvements in procedural practice developed
in other jurisdictions. It is safe to say that if a new method of
treating cancer were discovered and successfully employed in
England, every intelligent doctor in the world would almost
immediately know about it and attempt to take advantage of it.
But it is equally safe to say that if a new and successful method
of treating some procedural problem were discovered in England, American lawyers as a class would remain in substantial
ignorance of it for at least two generations, and would probably
treat it with scornful indifference for a generation or two more.
There are no state lines for progressive doctors, dentists, engineers, architects, manufacturers or business men. But not one
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 allows liberal amendment to assure refinement of the pleadings at appropriate stages.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
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lawyer in a hundred knows or cares what reforms are being
employed by his profession on the other side of the political
boundary. The American lawyer is satisfied with things as they
are. As long as clients continue to come and the machinery of
the law continues to move, he is . . . free from concern over the
methods used elsewhere . . . .
Unfortunately, in 1958 the South Carolina legislature rejected the "South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure," which contained the following rule of joinder:
The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a
counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate
claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he
may have against an opposing party. There may be like joinder
of claims when there are multiple parties if the requirements of
Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satisfied. There may be like joinder of
cross-claims or third-party claims if the requirements of Rule 13
and 14 respectively are satisfied.'
This rule was modeled upon the then existing federal rule of
joinder which has since been amended. 17 The present joinder
statute itself reflects the code's outdated approach through the
exemplification of the trappings of formalistic procedure. 77 Instead of permitting the scope of the litigation to be coextensive
with convenience in adjudication, the code arbitrarily restricts
the subject matter of a single proceeding. Because of the increasing amount and complexity of litigation, the need for a flexible
joinder rule, as well as a completely new, unified system of civil
procedure, is of pressing importance. Change in South Carolina
is not only necessary but also long overdue.
174. Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. Rav. 572, 573 (1920).
175. JUDICIAL CoUNcM, supra note 1, at 37.
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) states: "A party asserting a claim to relief as an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent
or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime as he has against an
opposing party."
177. See Knudsen, The Time Has Come For a Major Change in Oregon'sJabberwochy Code of Civil Procedure, 8 WILLIAMET L.J. 299 (1972).
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